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RETHINKING EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE: ARE
EDUCATORS ROCK STARS?
Stijepko Tokic, J.D., LL.M.*
I.

INTRODUCTION

Rock stars sometimes get sued over the quality of their
performances on the stage.1 One of the more recent highly
publicized lawsuits featured the performance of the rock band
Creed at the Allstate Arena in Rosemont, Illinois.2 In that case,
the lead singer allegedly mumbled through his lyrics, gave the
appearance of intoxication, rolled around on the floor of the
stage, and eventually left his band mates for extended periods
of time.3 Ultimately, some fans filed a class action suit over the
quality of the band’s performance, or lack thereof.4
Unfortunately for the fans, but fortunately for the
entertainment industry, the lawsuit was not successful.
The main reason why the lawsuit was not successful is the
fact that American jurisprudence does not allow for “causes of
action based on the disappointment of subjective consumer
expectations within the live performance industry.”5 As
explained by one commentator,
* Stijepko Tokic is an Assistant Professor of Business Law at the Northeastern Illinois
University in Chicago, Illinois. He acknowledges, with much appreciation, Ilina
Lazarova’s research assistance, and the support he received from the Title V Promoting
Postbaccalaureate Opportunities for Hispanic Americans Grant. He can be reached at
s-tokic@neiu.edu.
1 See e.g., Kass v. Young, 136 Cal. Rptr. 469 (Cal. Ct. App. 1977) (Neil Young
concert attendee filed a class action against the performer after Young performed for
only an hour because of the oppressive behavior exhibited by security personnel at the
venue).
2 Lara Weber & Drew Sottardi, Creed Fans Sue Over Show, RedEye, CHI. TRIB.,
Apr. 22, 2003, at 6.
3 Eric Gwinn, Some Creed Fans are Singing a Different Tune After Concert,
CHI. TRIB., Apr. 28, 2003, 5 (Tempo), at 2.
4 Id.
5 Brian A. Rosenblatt, I Know, It’s Only Rock and Roll, But Did They Like It?:
An Assessment of Causes of Action Concerning the Disappointment of Subjective
Consumer Expectations Within the Live Performance Industry, 13 UCLA ENT. L. REV.
33, 53 (2005).
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Existing case law shows that the purchase of a ticket to a live
event is nothing more than the purchase of a license that
entitles the purchaser to enter and remain in the venue for
the event, and perhaps entitles the purchaser to some form of
performance. By no means does the purchase of a ticket
entitle the purchaser to any level of quality in an event or
performance.6

When it comes to rock shows, this approach seems
appropriate.
Historically
speaking,
“spontaneity”
and
“unpredictability” have been paramount to rock shows, and
courts should not “dictate how rock performers must behave.”7
Moreover, it is possible that some fans might actually embrace
the experience of an unorganized and chaotic concert. Without
a doubt, concert attendees could form entirely different
perceptions about the duration and quality of the show based
on a mood on any given day, relative familiarity with a
particular band, or a music genre. Therefore, it is easy to see
why a ticket to a concert cannot guarantee any particular level
of quality of performance. However, does the same hold true for
the education industry? Should a “ticket” to the classroom
guarantee more than a right to enter and remain in the
classroom during the scheduled class? Should the purchase of a
“ticket” to a classroom entitle the purchaser to any level of
quality in the educators’ performance? Unfortunately, the
United States “Supreme Court has never provided guidance on
what students have [the] right to expect as consumers of an
educational product.”8
Quality has long been on the agenda of many educationrelated discussions, and the relative quality of educational
institutions is increasingly measured by the quality of their
output—that is, student learning.9 The issue of quality in the
Id. at 37.
See Memorandum and Order from Judge Peter Flynn, Berenz v. Diamond Rd.,
Inc., No. 03 CH 7106 (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ch. Div., July 13, 2004) (Judge Flynn
also quipped in his oral opinion regarding plaintiff’s first complaint that “rock singers
are—at least so [The] Rolling Stones would like us to believe—the unconstrained
element in our society. Lawyers are the precise opposite.”). See also Transcript and
Proceedings at 40, Judge Peter Flynn, Sept. 10, 2003, Berenz v. Diamond Rd., Inc., No.
03 CH 7106, (Ill. Cir. Ct. Cook County, Ch. Div., July 13, 2004).
8 Sarah Anjum, Students as Consumers: Finding and Applying a Workable
Standard when Institutions Fail to Give the Benefit of the Bargain, 43 U. TOL. L. REV.
151, 155 (2011).
9 The controversial large-scale standardized testing, designed to measure
students’ proficiency in certain key areas, has become prevalent in evaluating the
6
7
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educational context becomes very interesting in light of many
court decisions that have dealt with the issue of educational
malpractice. Tort lawsuits for educational malpractice have
been brought against all kinds of educational institutions,
including primary and secondary education institutions,10
institutions of higher education,11 professional schools,12 and so
on. Moreover, lawsuits for educational malpractice have even
been brought against accrediting associations.13 Notably, courts
have repeatedly rejected claims for educational malpractice on
the principle that can be summarized as, “the failure to learn
does not bespeak a failure to teach.”14 Although commentators
have articulated many theories of educational malpractice,15
and the courts continue to hear educational malpractice cases,16
educational malpractice is still merely “a tort theory beloved of
effectiveness of primary and secondary education institutions. See Rebecca Klein, Arne
Duncan’s AERA Speech: Standardized Test Criticism ‘Is Merited,’ HUFFINGTON POST,
May 2, 2013, http://www.huffingtonpost.com/2013/05/02/arne-duncan-aera-speechstandardized-tests_n_3196437.html. See also Valerie Strauss, Letter from disgusted
teacher:
“I
quit,”
THE
WASHINGTON
POST,
October
29,
2012,
http://www.washingtonpost.com/blogs/answer-sheet/wp/2012/10/29/letter-fromdisgusted-teacher-i-quit. Organizations, such as the Association to Advance Collegiate
Schools of Business (AACSB), which provides a prestigious AACSB accreditation to
business schools, has a whole chapter on Assurance of Learning in its accreditation
standards. See AACSB INTERNATIONAL, Assurance of Learning Overview and Intent of
Standards, http://www.aacsb.edu/accreditation/business/standards/aol/defining_aol.asp
(last visited May 28, 2013).
10 See infra note 24.
11 See e.g. Lawrence v. Lorain County Community College, 127 Ohio App. 3d
546, 713 N.E.2d 478 (Ohio Ct. App. 1998).
12 See infra note 16.
13 See Ambrose v. New Eng. Ass’n of Schs. & Colleges, Inc., 100 F. Supp. 2d 48,
2000 U.S. Dist. LEXIS 7999 (D. Me. 2000). The lawsuit was filed by seven former
students against NEACE, the accrediting association for Thomas College, the
institution where they obtained associate degrees in “medical assisting.” The plaintiffs
enrolled in the medical assisting program expecting it to qualify them for entry-level
positions as medical assistants. According to the court, the medical assisting program
had no clinical component. Because clinical tasks form a large part of a medical
assistant’s job, six of the seven plaintiffs were unable to find employment as medical
assistants. The seventh plaintiff obtained a job but lost it due her inadequate
knowledge and training. In their suit, the plaintiffs charged NEACE with fraud,
misrepresentation, and deceptive business practices based on the association’s
accreditation of the college.
14 Donohue v. Copiague Union Sch. Dist., 407 N.Y.S.2d 874, 881 (N.Y.A.D.
1978).
15 See infra notes 78–89.
16 Gomez-Jimenez v. New York Law Sch., No. 652226/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21,
2012); MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., F. Supp. 2d 2012 WL 2994107 (W.D.
Mich. July 20, 2012); Love v. Career Educ. Corp., 2012 WL 1684572 (E.D. Mo. May 15,
2012); Waugh v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 966 N.E.2d 540, 2012 (Ill. App.) LEXIS 133,
359, Ill. Dec. 219, 2012 IL App (1st) 102653 (2012).

Tokic Macro.docx (Do Not Delete)

108

3/4/14 11:28 PM

B.Y.U. EDUCATION & LAW JOURNAL

[2014

commentators, but not of courts.”17 So far, courts have upheld
some breach of contract claims against educational institutions,
but only in situations where an institution has failed to fulfill
some very specific promises to its students, such as a promise
to provide tutoring.18
This Article argues against using an output-based approach
in determining quality and legal liability of educational
institutions. The Article points out that, unlike in education,
the perceived quality of performance and malpractice liability
in other service-oriented industries, such as the medical and
legal industries, is overwhelmingly input/conduct-based.19
Naturally, this Article argues in favor of adopting an
input/conduct-based approach to educational malpractice,
where instructors’ and institutions’ conducts are separately
assessed, as is the case in medical malpractice cases.20 In
particular, the Article suggests that liability of educational
institutions should be determined solely by assessing whether
an institution has and enforces internal quality assurance
mechanisms that ought to promote the fulfillment of the
institutions’ own stated objectives, mission, and obligations.
The Article ultimately seeks to establish that recognizing
claims for educational malpractice based on institutional
negligence could play a vital role in promoting the quality and
accountability of educational institutions, without causing
undue hardship for administrators. Without change, educators
and their institutions will continue to be treated just like rock
stars, which does not foster an environment for enhancing the
quality and accountability of educational institutions.
This Article is divided as follows: Part II reviews leading
educational malpractice cases, explains the legal and policy
grounds for rejecting educational malpractice claims, and
underlines why the current framework for analyzing
educational malpractice claims is inappropriate and legally
unsound. Part III addresses the question of whether a “ticket”
to a classroom entitles students to any level of quality of
educational services, or merely the right to be in the classroom
for a specific period of time as the current law implies. Part III
explores predominantly foreign authority about the nature and
17
18
19
20

Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1327 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
Id. at 1331–32.
See infra notes 40–50.
See infra notes 104–110.
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concept of quality in education, and ultimately argues that
“fitness for purpose” is the most appropriate definition of
quality in the educational context. Part IV relies on the “fitness
for purpose” definition of quality to articulate a cause of action
for institutional negligence, and explains why this approach is
more legally sound than the current approach to educational
malpractice. Part IV also discusses potential criticisms of using
a concept of institutional negligence in the education industry,
namely the burden on administrators and academic freedom
issues.
Additionally, the scope of this article is limited in the
following ways: The courts have articulated three broad
categories of educational malpractice claims: “(1) the student
alleges that the school negligently failed to provide him with
adequate skills; (2) the student alleges that the school
negligently diagnosed or failed to diagnose his learning or
mental disabilities; or (3) the student alleges that the school
negligently supervised his training.”21 This Article is primarily
concerned with the first category of educational malpractice
claims. Furthermore, the Article only addresses educational
malpractice claims based on tort law, as scholars and
commentators have already explored numerous grounds for
holding educators liable based on causes of action outside of
tort law.22 Finally, while the main thesis of this Article can
conceptually be applied to educational institutions of all kinds,
it is likely to be most useful in the post-secondary setting.
II.

BRIEF OVERVIEW OF EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE
JURISPRUDENCE

As articulated by one court, “the term ‘educational
malpractice’ has a seductive ring to it; after all, if doctors,
lawyers, accountants, and other professionals can be held liable
for failing to exercise due care, why can’t teachers?”23 To be
21 Dallas Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety Int’l, Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696, 699 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2008).
22 See e.g. Kevin P. McJessy, Contract Law: The Proper Framework for
Litigating Educational Liability Claims, 89 NW. U. L. REV. 1768(1995).
23 The court answered its question by stating,

The answer is that the nature of education radically differs from other professions.
Education is an intensely collaborative process, requiring the interaction of
student with teacher. A good student can learn from a poor teacher; a poor student
can close his mind to a good teacher. Without effort by a student, he cannot be
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sure, claims for educational malpractice have been raised as
early as 1976,24 and as recently as 2012.25 While educational
malpractice cases can be brought on the basis of various legal
theories ranging from breach of contract26 to intentional torts
such as misrepresentation,27 educational malpractice claims
are generally brought under the theory of negligence where a
successful plaintiff must establish the following prima facie
elements: (1) existence of a legal duty of care owed by the
defendant to the plaintiff; (2) a breach of the legal duty by the
defendant; (3) causation between the defendant’s acts, or
failure to act, and the plaintiff’s injuries suffered; and (4)
damages suffered by the plaintiff.28
Courts have identified multiple reasons that counsel
against allowing claims for educational malpractice under the
theory of negligence. First, there is the lack of a satisfactory
standard of care by which to evaluate an educator.29 Theories of
education are not uniform, and “different but acceptable
scientific methods of academic training [make] it unfeasible to
formulate a standard by which to judge the conduct of those
delivering the services.”30 Second, when it comes to causation,

educated. Good teaching method may vary with the needs of the individual
student. In other professions, by contrast, client cooperation is far less important;
given a modicum of cooperation, a competent professional in other fields can
control the results obtained. But in education, the ultimate responsibility for
success remains always with the student. Both the process and the result are
subjective, and proof or disproof extremely difficult.

Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1338 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
24 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 859 (Ct. App. 1976).
25 Gomez-Jimenez v. New York Law Sch., No. 652226/11 (N.Y. Sup. Ct. Mar. 21.
2012); MacDonald v. Thomas M. Cooley Law Sch., F. Supp. 2d 2012 WL 2994107 (W.D.
Mich. July 20, 2012); Love v. Career Educ. Corp., 2012 WL 1684572 (E.D. Mo. May
15,2012); Waugh v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 966 N.E.2d 540, 2012 Ill. App. LEXIS 133,
359 Ill. Dec. 219, 2012 IL App (1st) 102653 (2012).
26 See Bittle v. Oklahoma City Univ. (OCU), 6 P.3d 509, 515 (Okla. Civ. App.
2000).
27 See Love, 2012 WL 1684572.
28 See W. PAGE KEETON ET. AL., PROSSER AND KEETON ON THE LAW OF TORTS §
30, at 164–65 (5th ed.1984); See Michael J. Polelle, Who’s on First, and What’s a
Professional?, 33 U.S.F. L. REV. 205, 206 (1999). (“Judicial intervention in the specific
professions of medicine and law has largely molded the malpractice law applied to all
professionals.”).
29 Smith v. Alameda Cnty. Soc. Servs. Agency, 90 Cal. App. 3d 929, 941; 153 Cal.
Rptr. 712, 719 (Ct. App. 1979).
30 Swidryk v. St. Michael’s Med. Ctr., 201 N.J. Super. 601, 493 A.2d 641, 643
(N.J. Super. Ct. Law Div.1985) (citing Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60
Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal. Rptr. 854, 859 (Ct. App. 1976)).
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educational malpractice cases inherently entail uncertainties
when it comes to the cause and nature of damages.31 “Factors
such as the student’s attitude, motivation, temperament, past
experience and home environment may all play an essential
and immeasurable role in learning.”32 Consequently, it may be
a “practical impossibility [to prove] that the alleged malpractice
of the teacher proximately caused the learning deficiency of the
plaintiff student.”33
Besides “practical” reasons, courts have also articulated
multiple policy reasons that counsel against allowing claims for
educational malpractice under the theory of negligence. The
first reason is the fear of a potential flood of litigation against
schools.34 As one district court noted, “education is a service
rendered on an immensely greater scale than other
professional services.”35 Consequently, the potential number of
claims that could arise if educational malpractice causes of
action were allowed might overburden schools.36 Yet another
policy concern courts have cited is the fear that an educational
malpractice cause of action could entangle the courts into
overseeing the day-to-day operations of schools,37 which might
be particularly inappropriate in the university setting due to
considerations of academic freedom and autonomy.38
Ultimately, in light of the enumerated practical and policy
reasons, courts have found that a common-law tort remedy
may not be the best way to deal with the problem of inadequate
education.39
A.

The Wrong-Headed Approach?

According to its dictionary meaning, malpractice literally
means “bad practice.”40 In fact, scholars have long recognized
31

Helm v. Professional Children’s School, 431 N.Y.S.2d 246, 246–47 (App. Term

1980).
32 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free School Dist., 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1355, (N.Y.
1979) (Wachtler, J., concurring).
33 Id.
34 Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 114–15 (Iowa 1986).
35 Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1329 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
36 Id.
37 Donohue, 391 N.E.2d at 1354; Hoffman v. Bd. of Educ., 400 N.E.2d 317, 320
(N.Y. 1979). Hunter v. Bd. of Educ., 439 A.2d 582, 585 (Md. 1982).
38 Moore, 386 N.W.2d at 115.
39 Ross, 740 F. Supp. at 1329.
40 BLACK’S LAW DICTIONARY at 959 (6th ed. 1990).
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that “the standard [for malpractice] is one of conduct, rather
than consequences.”41 In the legal industry, a lawyer commits
malpractice “by giving an erroneous legal opinion or erroneous
advice, by delaying or failing to handle a matter entrusted to
the lawyer’s care, or by not using a lawyer’s ordinary care in
preparing, managing, and prosecuting a case.”42 For example,
in one case, an attorney who did not specialize in the area of
family law represented a woman in a divorce case, and the
court found that the attorney’s failure to research the issue of
the community property nature of her client’s husband’s
military pension constituted malpractice.43 Other types of
behavior that can lead to a legal malpractice claim include
[f]ailure to know the law, inadequate investigation, missed
statute of limitations, conflict of interest, errors or omissions
that result in a lawsuit being dismissed, billing fraud,
improper legal advice, dishonest, breach of fiduciary duty,
obstruction of justice, failure to inform a client or get a client’s
consent, [and] failure to follow client instructions.44

Similarly, in the medical industry, a medical professional is
liable for malpractice when she/he does not meet the acceptable
standard of care, such as in a recent “blockbuster” case where a
jury awarded $6.7 million dollars to a widow whose husband
died from injuries caused by internal bleeding.45 The lawsuit
was based on allegations that the doctor failed to follow up on
the indications of internal bleeding, as he did not issue an
order for follow-up X-rays to monitor the internal bleeding.46
Other negligence incidents that can lead to medical malpractice
are “misdiagnosis, failure to diagnose in time, surgical error,
failure to follow up with treatment, failure to treat in a timely
manner, anesthesia error, [and] . . . prescription error.”47
KEETON ET AL., supra note 28, at 170.
Murphy v. Gruber, 241 S.W.3d 689, 692 (Tex. App. Dallas, 2007).
43 See Smith v. Lewis, 530 P.2d 589 (Cal. 1975), (overruled on other grounds by
In re Marriage of Brown, 544 P.2d 561 (Cal. 1976)).
44 See
Legal
Malpractice
Lawsuit,
LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM,
http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/lawsuit/legal-malpractice.html#.UQar7IXQm0I
(last visited May 21, 2013).
45 Judy Harrison, Jury Awards Widow $6.7 Million in Medical Malpractice
Lawsuit,
BANGORDAILYNEWS.COM
(June
14,
2011,
at
1:59
PM),
http://bangordailynews.com/2011/06/14/news/bangor/jury-awards-widow-6-7-million-inmedical-malpractice-lawsuit/.
46 Id.
47 Id.
See also Medical Malpractice, LAWYERSANDSETTLEMENTS.COM,
http://www.lawyersandsettlements.com/lawsuit/medical_malpractice.html#.UQsWuoX
41
42
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Examples from the legal and medical industry clearly
indicate that malpractice liability is not outcome/consequences
based. As put by one commentator while addressing
educational malpractice issues,
[p]atients die and clients go to jail. The outcome of the
rendering of professional services is not always positive.
‘[C]ourts recognize that part of being a professional includes
making judgment calls that may not always guarantee a
positive result.’ The issue, generally, is whether or not the
professional rendered the expected service. Following the
examples from medicine and law, the issue would not be
whether the student learned, but whether the educator
rendered the instruction that would be expected of a
professional educator.48

Although malpractice lawsuits should be about “conduct,”
many educational malpractice cases have focused on
“consequences.”49 Such a wrong-headed approach makes it
virtually impossible to prove educational malpractice, which
makes it overly convenient for courts to dismiss educational
malpractice claims without even evaluating “whether the
educator rendered the instruction that would be expected of a
professional educator.”50
To be sure, courts have had an opportunity to hear certain
QlCN (last visited May 21, 2013).
48 Todd A. DeMitchell, Terri A. DeMitchell, and Douglas Gagnon, Teacher
Effectiveness and Value-Added Modeling: Building a Pathway to Educational
Malpractice? 2012 BYU EDUC. & L.J. 257, 296 (2012) (emphasis added).
49 See Waugh v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 966 N.E.2d 540, 2012, Ill. App. LEXIS
133, 359, Ill. Dec. 219, 2012 Ill. App (1st) 102653 (Educational malpractice claim for
allegedly receiving inadequate training not cognizable). Glorvigen v. Cirrus Design
Corp., 796 N.W.2d 541, 553 (Minn. Ct. App. 2011) (“The bar on educational-malpractice
claims recognizes that ‘[a]llowing individuals . . . to assert claims of negligent
instruction would avoid the practical reality that, in the end, it is the student who is
responsible for his knowledge, including the limits of that knowledge.’”). See also
Houston v. Mile High Adventist Academy, 846 F. Supp. 1449, 1455–56 (D. Colo. 1994)
(claiming that teachers were “not properly trained,” and that “school failed to provide
adequate instruction” were construed as educational malpractice and properly
dismissed). Johnson v. Clark, 165 Mich. App. 366, 418 N.W. 2d 466 (Mich. Ct. App.
1987); 49 Dallas Airmotive, Inc. v. FlightSafety Int’l., Inc., 277 S.W.3d 696, 700 (Mo.
App. W.D. 2008) Dallas Airmotive, 277 S.W. 3d at 700; Christensen v. S. Normal Sch.,
790 So. 2d 252, 255 (Ala. 2001) (claim is barred by educational malpractice doctrine if
the claims “require an analysis of the quality of education received”); Gupta v. New
Britain General Hospital, 239 Conn. 574, 687 A.2d 111 (Conn. 1996) (claim based on
institution’s failure to provide “adequate training” was not cognizable); Lawrence v.
Lorain County Community College, 127 Ohio App. 3d 546, 713 N.E.2d 478 (court would
not recognize any claim that educational services were “substandard” or “inadequate”).
50 See DeMitchell, DeMitchell, & Gagnon, supra note 48 at 296.
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specific “conduct”-based cases. For example, in Bittle v.
Oklahoma City University (OCU), the plaintiff alleged that
his constitutional law professor frequently arrived late for
class, discharged class early, or canceled class altogether; that
neither the professor nor OCU provided make-up classes or
academic counseling to assist students as OCU implicitly
agreed; and that the failures of the professor (OCU’s agent),
OCU and the Board in these particulars caused his academic
dismissal.51

On these facts, the plaintiff “asserted claims for fraud,
breach of contract, tortious breach of contract, [and] negligence
. . . seeking actual and punitive damages.”52 However, the court
declined to recognize the claim based on “inadequate or
improper instruction,”53 finding that all of the plaintiff’s claims
commonly alleged OCU’s failure to provide him an “adequate
legal education.” As such, the court determined the plaintiff’s
claims were based upon a theory of “educational malpractice,”
which Oklahoma law did not recognize in the absence of a
specific, identifiable agreement for the provision of particular
services.54
In another similar case, Miller v. Loyola University of New
Orleans, a law student sued a university for negligence and
breach of contract based on the manner in which a faculty
member taught a course.55 The student charged that the
instructor failed to order course materials in a timely manner,
that she changed the course time without the permission of law
school officials, that she had students make class presentations
on subjects she was obligated to teach, that she only covered
approximately 60% of the material, that she only gave a final
examination that consisted partly of materials from the
National Conference of Bar Examiners, and that her original

2000 OK Civ. App. 66, 6 P.3d 509, 511 (Okla. Civ. App. 2000).
Id. at 512.
53 Id. at 515.
54 Id. at 515 (“. . . absent a specific, identifiable agreement for the provision of
particular services, the public policy of this state similarly militates against recognition
of a claim by a student against a private educational institution arising from the
institution’s alleged improper or inadequate instruction however denominated—either
in tort or contract—for “educational malpractice.” Notwithstanding his protestations to
the contrary, all of Bittle’s claims for fraud, breach of contract, tortious breach of
contract, negligence, and unjust enrichment commonly allege a willful or negligent
failure of OCU to provide him an adequate legal education . . .”).
55 829 So. 2d 1057 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
51
52
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questions contained serious errors.56 After law school officials
looked into the allegations, concluding that at least some of
them had merit, the student filed suit, seeking to recover the
cost of taking the course and reimbursement for the cost of
taking the course a second time from a different instructor.57
Ultimately, without even evaluating the instructor’s conduct,
an appellate court affirmed the rejection of all of the student’s
claims, declaring flatly, “Louisiana law does not recognize a
cause of action for educational malpractice under contract or
tort law.”58 In support of its conclusion, the court simply cited
the decision from Bittle v. Oklahoma City University, and other
general policy concerns for rejecting educational malpractice
claims.59
These cases seem to indicate that courts tend to view
specific conduct-based educational malpractice cases merely as
an attempt to mask “allegations of educational malpractice,” 60
and “circumvent the fact that educational malpractice is not a
recognized cause of action.”61 While it might be true that “the
nature of education radically differs from other professions,”62
the standards for liability in educational malpractice cases
should not “radically differ” from standards used in other
professions. Therefore, courts should refrain from bundling and
generalizing claims for educational malpractice, and should
move towards adopting an input/conduct-based approach to
educational malpractice. The following section addresses the
policy concerns for rejecting educational malpractice cases and
the “bandwagon” problem.
B.

“Fiat Justitia, Ruat Coelum”

Perhaps the biggest problem with educational malpractice
lawsuits is the lack of independent analysis by the courts. The
courts tend to dismiss any claim that “smells” like a claim for

Miller, 6 P.3d at 1058.
Id. at 1059.
58 Id. at 1061.
59 Id. at 1060.
60 Lawrence v. Lorain County Community College, 127 Ohio App. 3d 546, 549
(Ohio Ct. App. 1998) (“The trial court characterized Lawrence’s claims as masking
allegations of educational malpractice, which is barred as a cause of action in this
state.”).
61 Id. at 548.
62 Ross v. Creighton Univ., 740 F. Supp. 1319, 1328 (N.D. Ill. 1990).
56
57
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educational malpractice simply by citing to other courts that
have done the same.63 For example, in a very recent educational
malpractice case from Illinois, the court stated, “[w]hile Illinois
has not addressed whether educational malpractice claims are
cognizable, most jurisdictions that have considered the issue
have found that educational malpractice claims are not
cognizable.”64 The bandwagon mentality has created a snowball
effect that has resulted in a smothering of educational
malpractice claims. Of course, the United States is a commonlaw jurisdiction and courts ought to respect stare decisis and
the value of legal precedents (even from other jurisdictions),
but the courts need to recognize that not all educational
malpractice claims are factually the same, and that the
articulated policy concerns for rejecting educational
malpractice claims are fairly arcane.65 In fact, the key policy
concerns that courts keep citing were articulated in two early
educational malpractice cases from the 1970s.66
The main policy concerns for rejecting educational
malpractice (the fear of a “flood of litigation,” overburdening
the schools and the alleged difficulty in framing an appropriate
measure of damages) were objected to in the first case in the
United States that used the phrase “educational malpractice.”67
Initially, it must be emphasized that the policy considerations
enunciated in Peter W., supra, do not mandate a dismissal of
the complaint. Whether the failure of the plaintiff to achieve a
basic level of literacy was caused by the negligence of the

63 Waugh v. Morgan Stanley & Co., 966 N.E.2d 540, 551, 2012 Ill. App. LEXIS
133, 359 Ill. Dec. 219, 2012 IL App (1st) 102653 (2012). (“While Illinois has not
addressed whether educational malpractice claims are cognizable, most jurisdictions
that have considered the issue have found that educational malpractice claims are not
cognizable.”) (citing nine cases); Paladino v. Adelphi Univ., 454 N.Y.S.2d 868, 870
(1982) (“The courts have uniformly refused, based on public policy considerations, to
enter the classroom to determine claims based upon educational malpractice.”) (citing
seven cases); Swidryk v. St. Michael’s Medical Center, 493 A.2d 641, 642 (citing nine
cases); Moore v. Vanderloo, 386 N.W.2d 108, 113 (citing thirteen cases); Ross, 957 F.2d
at 414 (citing fourteen cases in eleven states); Moss Rehab v. White, 692 A.2d 902, 906
(Del. 1997) (citing fifteen cases); Doe v. Yale University, 1997 WL 766845, *1 (Conn.
Super. 1997) (citing twelve cases).
64 Waugh, 966 N.E.2d at 551.
65 Peter W. v. San Francisco Unified Sch. Dist., 60 Cal. App. 3d 814, 131 Cal.
Rptr. 854, 859 (Ct. App. 1976); Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 47 N.Y.2d
440, 446, 391 N.E.2d 1352, 1355 (1979) (Wachtler, J., concurring).
66 Id.
67 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 64 A.D.2d 29, 42–43, 407
N.Y.S.2d 874, 883–84 (1978) (Suozzi, J., dissenting).
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school system, as the plaintiff alleges, or was the product of
forces outside the teaching process, is really a question of
proof to be resolved at a trial. The fear of a flood of litigation,
perhaps much of it without merit, and the possible difficulty
in framing an appropriate measure of damages, are similarly
unpersuasive grounds for dismissing the instant cause of
action. Fear of excessive litigation caused by the creation of a
new zone of liability was effectively refuted by the abolition of
sovereign immunity many years ago, and numerous
environmental actions fill our courts where damages are
difficult to assess. Under the circumstances, there is no
reason to differentiate between educational malpractice on
the one hand, and other forms of negligence and malpractice
litigation which currently congest our courts.68

In the period following the early educational malpractice cases,
scholars immediately began arguing against the flat-out
rejection of educational malpractice claims.69 Interestingly
enough, the House of Lords in England has rejected the public
policy arguments advanced against educational malpractice in
the United States. It stated,
I am not persuaded by these fears. I do not think they provide
sufficient reason for treating work in the classroom as
territory which the courts must never enter. . . .
I am not persuaded that there are sufficient grounds to
exclude these claims even on grounds of public policy alone. It
does not seem to me that there is any wider interest of the
law which would require that no remedy in damages be
available. I am not persuaded that the recognition of a
liability upon employees of the education authority for
damages for negligence in education would lead to a flood of
claims, or even vexatious claims, which would overwhelm the
school authorities, nor that it would add burdens and
distractions to the already intensive life of teachers. Nor
should it inspire some peculiarly defensive attitude in the
performance of their professional responsibilities. On the
contrary, it may have the healthy effect of securing that high

Id.
John Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational Harms Caused by
Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 NW. U. L. REV 641 (1978). Robert H. Jerry, II,
Recovery in Tort for Educational Malpractice: Problems in Theory and Practice, 29
KAN. L. REV 195 (1981). Terrence P. Collingsworth, Applying Negligence Doctrine to the
Teaching Profession, 11 J. LAW & EDUCATION 479 (1982) (arguing that ordinary
negligence principles can be easily applied to educational liability actions and in fact
would not break new ground).
68
69
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standards are sought and secured.70

It is worth mentioning that the public policy reasons for
shielding educators from malpractice liability have been raised
and rejected before in various contexts. For example, the fear of
opening the floodgates of litigation has been used to deny
claims for mental distress, which are now generally allowed.71
While addressing the issue of “floodgates of litigation,” two
respected scholars have opined:
It is the business of the law to remedy wrongs that deserve it,
even at the expense of a “flood of litigation,” and it is a pitiful
confession of incompetence on the part of any court of justice
to deny relief on such grounds. That a multiplicity of actions
may follow is not a persuasive objection; if injuries are
multiplied, actions should be multiplied, so injured parties
may have recompense. So far as distinguishing true claims
from false ones is concerned, what is required is rather a
careful scrutiny of the evidence supporting the claim; and the
elimination of trivialities calls for nothing more than the
same common sense which has distinguished serious from
trifling injuries in other fields of the law.72

These remarks have been cited in many court decisions,73 and
some courts have used similar reasoning to recognize tort
claims for emotional distress.74
In addition to claims for emotional distress, it is worth

70 Phelps v. London Borough of Hillingdon; Anderton v. Clwyd County Council;
Jarvis v. Hampshire County Council; Re G (a minor) [2000] 4 All ER 504, 530–535,
available
at
http://www.publications.parliament.uk/pa/ld199900/ldjudgmt/jd000727/phelp-4.htm
(last visited May 1, 2013).
71 See Frank J. Cavico, The Tort of Intentional Infliction of Emotional Distress in
the Private Employment Sector, 21 HOFSTRA LAB. & EMP. L.J. 109, 111–113 (2003).
72 KEETON et al., supra note 28, §12, at 56.
73 See e.g. Wisniewski v. Kennard, 901 F.2d 1276, 1280 (Fed. Cir. 1990); Doe v.
Bd. of Educ. of Montgomery County, 453 A.2d 814, 823 (Md.App. 1982); Davis v.
Bostick, 580 P.2d 544, 546–47 (Ore. 1978); Yandrich v. Radic, 15 Pa. D. & C.3d 698,
705–06 (Dauphin County 1979); Zentz v. Harne, 2 Pa. D. & C.5th 398, 410 (Somerset
County 2007).
74 The court states,

This court is not satisfied that a flood of litigation with fraudulent claims or the
resurrecting of fault, or the possibility of confusing the issues of custody, support,
and equitable distribution should deny one spouse from suing the other in a
divorce proceeding for emotional distress without physical injury. There is neither
valid policy interest nor logical reason to allow [it]. It is this court’s opinion that an
independent cause of action between spouses for emotional distress without
physical injury should exist in a divorce case.

Ruprecht v. Ruprecht, 599 A.2d 604, 606 (N.J. Super. Ct. 1991).
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mentioning that the public policy reasons that currently shield
educators from malpractice liability were also rejected as a
justification for the immunity of state and local governments
from tort liability.75 The reasoning for ending immunity of state
and local governments from tort liability was substantially
similar to the reasoning for allowing claims for mental
distress.76
Therefore, instead of reciting and relying on the same stale
public policy arguments that have been rejected in various
other contexts, the courts hearing educational malpractice
cases should acknowledge arguments against these arcane
public policy reasons and, ultimately, follow the old legal
principle: “Fiat justitia, ruat coelum. (Let justice be done,
though the heavens fall).”77 The following section explores the
grounds for holding educators liable for educational
malpractice.
III. HOLDING EDUCATORS LIABLE
In addition to numerous theories of educational malpractice
based on negligence,78 scholars and commentators have
75 Jones v. Knight, 373 So. 2d 254, 264 (Miss. 1979) (“We must also reject the
fear of excessive litigation as a justification for the immunity doctrine. Empirically,
there is little support for the concern that the courts will be flooded with litigation if
the doctrine is abandoned. . . . More compelling than an academic debate over the
apparent or real increases in the amount of litigation, is the fundamental concept of
our judicial system that any such increase should not be determinative or relevant to
the availability of a judicial forum for the adjudication of impartial individual rights.”);
Muskopf v. Corning Hosp. Dist., 359 P.2d 457 (Calif. 1961); Ayala v. Philadelphia
Board Edu., 305 A.2d 877 (Pa. 1973); Mayle v. Penn. Dept. Highways, 388 A.2d 709
(Pa. 1978).
76 See Jones, 373 So. 2d at 264.
77 Hoffman v. Board of Education, 410 N.Y.S.2d 99, 111 (1978), rev’d, 400 N.E.2d
317 (N.Y. 1979).
78 See, e.g., Terrance P. Collingsworth, Applying Negligence Doctrine to the
Teaching Profession, 11 J. L. & EDUC. 479 (1982) (arguing that ordinary negligence
principles can be easily applied to educational liability actions and, in fact, would not
break new ground); John Elson, A Common Law Remedy for the Educational Harms
Caused by Incompetent or Careless Teaching, 73 NW. U. L. REV. 641 (1978) (arguing
that a cause of action for malpractice may exist but only where the conduct of
educators is particularly egregious); William F. Foster, Educational Malpractice: A
Tort for the Untaught?,19 U. BRIT. COLUM. L. REV. 161 (1985); Richard Funston,
Educational Malpractice: A Cause of Action in Search of a Theory, 18 SAN DIEGO L.
REV. 743 (1981); Robert H. Jerry, II, Recovery in Tort for Educational Malpractice:
Problems of Theory and Policy, 29 KAN. L. REV. 195 (1981); Johnny C. Parker,
Educational Malpractice: A Tort is Born, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 301 (1991) (arguing that
proximate cause can be proven in an educational malpractice claim and should not
serve as a barrier to such actions); Gershon M. Ratner, A New Legal Duty for Urban
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frequently explored other grounds for holding educators liable.
For example, some commentators have argued that courts
should be willing to adopt a contractual framework for
administering litigation involving educational liability issues,
and the courts can look to three theories of contract law for
administering suits against schools: express contract,
promissory estoppel, and third-party beneficiary.79 It was
suggested that express contract law can be applied to nearly all
aspects of the student-school relationship at nearly all levels,
but, if courts are unwilling to adopt a rigid contract approach,
the more flexible theories of promissory estoppel and thirdparty beneficiary should be applied.80 The focus of promissory
estoppel in an educational liability action is on the reasonable
reliance by the parents and students of an educational
institution’s “promises,”81 while a third-party beneficiary claim
could enable the plaintiff to argue that she was the beneficiary
of the contract between educational institutions and the
teachers.82

Public Schools: Effective Education in Basic Skills, 63 TEX. L. REV. 777 (1985)
(advocating class action suits for educational malpractice by students in school systems
where 50% or more of the students are below national education levels); Judith H.
Berliner Cohen, The ABC’s of Duty: Educational Malpractice and the Functionally
Illiterate Student, 8 GOLDEN GATE U. L. REV. 293 (1978); Joan Blackburn, Educational
Malpractice: When Can Johnny Sue?, 7 FORDHAM URB. L.J. 117 (1978); Karen H.
Calavenna, Comment, Educational Malpractice, 64 U. DET. L. REV. 717 (1987); Laurie
S. Jamieson, Educational Malpractice: A Lesson in Professional Accountability, 32 B.C.
L. REV. 899 (1991); Alice J. Klein, Educational Malpractice: Can the Judiciary Remedy
the Growing Problem of Functional Illiteracy?, 13 SUFFOLK U. L. REV. 27 (1979)
(arguing that minimum competency standards might be used to establish a duty of care
in educational malpractice actions); Michael A. Magone, Educational Malpractice—
Does the Cause of Action Exist?, 49 MONT. L. REV. 140 (1988); Daryl A. Nelson,
Educational Malpractice, 4 GEO. MASON U. L. REV. 261 (1981); Destin S. Tracy,
Educational Negligence: A Student’s Cause of Action for Incompetent Academic
Instruction, 58 N.C. L. REV. 561 (1980); Edward J. Wallison Jr., Note, Nonliability for
Negligence in the Public Schools—“Educational Malpractice” from Peter W. to
Hoffman, 55 NOTRE DAME LAW. 814 (1980); Kimberly A. Wilkins, Educational
Malpractice: A Cause of Action in Need of a Call for Action, 22 VAL. U. L. REV. 427
(1988) (advocating that courts permit educational malpractice claims); Nancy L.
Woods, Educational Malfeasance: A New Cause of Action for Failure to Educate?, 14
TULSA L.J. 383 (1978) (arguing that competency-based education laws provide a duty of
care in educational malpractice claims); Frank D. Aquila, Educational Malpractice: A
Tort en Ventre, 39 CLEV. ST. L. REV. 323 (1991) (arguing that professional malpractice
claims are inappropriate in the field of education in part because educators are not
professional).
79 See McJessy, supra note 22.
80 Id. at 1815–1816.
81 Id. at 1804–1807 (describing in detail promissory estoppel claims).
82 Id. at 1807–1810 (describing in detail third-party beneficiary claims).
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Other commentators have previously proposed other
creative approaches. One commentator has compared the
nature of decision-making engaged in by educators in the
educational malpractice context to decision-making by
corporate management.83 She suggested that the two are
comparable, as the judiciary hesitates to intervene in both
contexts because “it does not want to infringe upon the policymaking domain of corporate directors and educators.”84
However, unlike corporate directors that enjoy qualified
immunity for poor decision-making under the “business
judgment rule,” educators currently enjoy complete immunity.85
This commentator also suggested that the principle for liability
of corporate directors could be used in the education setting,
which would end the absolute immunity of educators and,
ultimately, make educators accountable for conduct that
amounts to gross negligence.86
There have been other very “unique” approaches to
educational liability. For example, one commentator has
proposed a conceptualization of educational liability based on
the correlation between property values and school
performance.87 Under this approach, it was suggested that the
proper plaintiff in a suit for educational liability should be a
class composed of property owners, not necessarily students or
parents and that, ultimately, courts should embrace the
liability of educational institutions to local property owners,
instead of contemplating the liability of educational
institutions to students.88 The property-ownership approach is
mainly concerned with “big decisions” of the administrators,
and is based on the assumption that poor performance of
students in the school to which residents of a property are
assigned under the local school district’s residential
assignment scheme reduces the value of their property.89
In spite of the various creative theories for holding
83 Cheryl L. Wade, Educators Who Drive With No Hands: The Application of
Analytical Concepts of Corporate Law in Certain Cases of Educational Malpractice, 32
SAN DIEGO L. REV. 437, 441 (1995).
84 Id. at 441.
85 Id. at 449–450.
86 Id. at 452–455.
87 Geoffrey Rapp, Reconsidering Educational Liability: Property-Owners as
Litigants, Constructive Trust as Remedy, 18 YALE L. & POL’Y REV. 463 (2000).
88 Id. at 464, 473.
89 Id.
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educators liable, the issue of educational malpractice is still in
status quo. In fact, the issue is likely to remain in status quo
until it is resolved as to whether a “ticket” to a classroom
entitles a “purchaser” to more than a right to enter and remain
in the classroom during the scheduled class, or in other words,
whether a “ticket” to a classroom entitles a “purchaser” to any
level of quality of educational services. Consequently, in order
to determine what kind and level of quality a purchaser of a
“ticket” to a classroom might be entitled to, it is necessary to
define “quality” in the educational context.
A.

“What the Hell is Quality?”90

As noted by one commentator, “we all have an intuitive
understanding of what quality means but it is often hard to
articulate. Quality, like ‘liberty’, ‘equality’, ‘freedom’ or ‘justice’,
is a slippery concept.”91 Recognizing that the concept of quality
has not been adequately explored, at least in the context of
education, some commentators have sought to define the
nature and the concept of quality.92 In a widely cited article,
“Defining Quality,” Harvey and Green have identified five
categories or ways to define quality. As cited in another article,
the definition of quality can be summarized as follows:93
Exception

“The exceptional notion of quality takes as
axiomatic that quality is something special.
There are three variations of this. First, the
traditional notion of quality as distinctive,
second, a view of quality as embodied in
excellence (that is, exceeding very high
standards) and third, a weaker notion of
exceptional quality, as passing a set of
required (minimum) standards.”

Perfection

This approach sees quality in terms of
consistency. “It focuses on process and sets

90 CHRISTOPHER BALL, “FITNESS FOR PURPOSE: ESSAYS IN HIGHER EDUCATION
96–102 (Dorma Urwin ed., SRHE & NFER/Nelson 1985) (“What the Hell is Quality?”).
91 See Lee Harvey & Diana Green, Defining Quality, ASSESSMENT AND
EVALUATION IN HIGHER EDUCATION, Apr.1993, at 9–34.
92 Id.
93 Id. See also Kim Watty, When will Academics Learn about Quality?, QUALITY
IN HIGHER ED., 2003, at 213–221.

Tokic Macro.docx (Do Not Delete)

1]

3/4/14 11:28 PM

RETHINKING EDUCATIONAL MALPRACTICE

123

specifications that it aims to meet perfectly.
This is encapsulated in two interrelated
dictums: zero defects and getting things right
first time.”
Fitness
Purpose

for This approach “relates quality to the purpose
of a product or service.” It suggests that
“quality only has meaning in relation to the
purpose of the product or service. Quality is
thus judged in terms of the extent to which
the product or service fits its purpose. This
notion is quite remote from the idea of quality
as something special, distinctive, elitist,
conferring status or difficult to attain.”

Value
Money

for This approach focuses on “efficiency and
effectiveness,” measuring outputs against
inputs, and it is a populist notion of quality
(government).

Transformation

“A qualitative change; education is about
doing something to the student as opposed to
something for the consumer. Includes concepts
of
enhancing
and
empowering:
democratization of the process, not just
outcomes.”

It has been suggested that “fitness for purpose” and
“transformation” are the two most appropriate definitions of
quality in the context of education.94 As noted above, “fitness
for purpose” relates quality to the purpose of a product or
service and, therefore, “quality only has meaning in relation to
the purpose of the product or service.”95 However, some
commentators have pointed out that although straightforward
in theory, “fitness for purpose” is deceptive because it raises the
questions of: “whose purpose?” and “how is fitness assessed?”96
94 Laurie Lomas, Presentation: The End of Quality?, Society for Research in
Higher Education Conference (SRHE) Annual Conference, May 25–26 2001,
Birmingham, UK.
95 See Harvey and Green, supra note 91.
96 GRAEME C. MOODIE, STANDARDS AND CRITERIA IN HIGHER EDUCATION, 1–8
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To address these issues, the “fitness for purpose” approach
“offers two alternative priorities for specifying the purpose.”
The first priority focuses on customers, while the second one
focuses on the provider. It has been suggested that, “the tricky
issue of determining who are the customers of education and
what their requirements are can be circumscribed by returning
the emphasis to the institution.”97 Under this approach, instead
of focusing on meeting customer requirements, quality can be
defined in terms of the institution fulfilling its own stated
objectives, or mission.98 Although focusing on the institution
can help with defining quality in the context of “fitness for
purpose,” the provider-centered approach has its limitations
because it is not easy to determine whether an institution is
achieving its enumerated purposes, which brings into question
the role of quality assurance. It has been proffered that, as an
alternative to the subjective assessment of achievement of
purpose, “quality assurance is about ensuring that there are
mechanisms, procedures and processes in place to ensure that
the desired quality, however defined and measured, is
delivered.”99 Obviously, the critical assumption is that “if
mechanisms exist, quality can be assured,” so the main
emphasis is on having quality control mechanisms in place.100
B. Articulating Educational Malpractice Based on a “Fitness
for Purpose” Definition of Quality: What Should Courts Look
for?
The long line of failed educational malpractice cases that
were based on “failure to learn” clearly establishes that
students are not entitled to a “quality” education.101 While some
notable experts have long used the term instructional
negligence in order to more accurately characterize this area of
education law,102 some decisions indicate that students are also
not entitled to a “quality” instructor.103 However, what about

(Guildford, SRHE & NF Nelson 1986).
97 See Harvey and Green, supra note 91.
98 Id.
99 Id.
100 Id.
101 See supra notes 63–64.
102 MARTHA M, MCCARTHY ET AL., PUBLIC SCHOOL LAW 89 (4th ed.1992).
103 See Bittle v. Oklahoma City University, 2000 OK CIV APP 66, 6 P.3d 509,
511–515. See also Miller v. Loyola University of New Orleans, 829 So. 2d 1057, 1060–
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“fitness for purpose” as a definition of quality in educational
context? Are students at least entitled to an institution that
has and enforces quality assurance mechanisms, procedures,
and processes designed to fulfill its own stated objectives,
mission, and obligations? One would certainly hope so. The
following section articulates the possible tort cause of action
against educational institutions based on the “fitness for
purpose” definition of quality.
1. Educational malpractice based on institutional negligence
The reason for unsuccessful lawsuits against educational
institutions just might be the fact that a cause of action against
educators is known as “educational malpractice,” which
inherently places “education,” and consequently the conduct of
a teacher, at the center of analysis. However, exploring an
alternative cause of action known as institutional negligence
can alleviate this problem. The cause of action for institutional
negligence originated in medical malpractice litigation, where
courts reasoned that “hospitals have an independent duty to
assume responsibility for the care of their patients.”104 For
example, in a fairly recent case, Oscar Salinas v. Advocate
Health and Hospital Corp., the plaintiff filed a medical
malpractice lawsuit against both Dr. Ramillo and the Advocate
Christ Hospital for improper treatment of his knee injury.105
Shortly after filling the lawsuit, the plaintiff dismissed
Advocate Christ Hospital from the medical malpractice lawsuit,
but then brought an institutional negligence lawsuit against
Advocate Christ Hospital the following year.106 The medical
malpractice lawsuit against the doctor focused on the doctor’s
negligence, while the institutional negligence lawsuit dealt
with allegations that the hospital should have had policies and
procedures in place to prevent certain errors from occurring.107
Notably, in addition to hospitals, health maintenance
61 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
104 Frigo v. Silver Cross Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 876 N.E.2d 697, 721, 723 (Ill. App.
Ct. 2007). See also Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 211 N.E.2d
253 (Ill. 1965); Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1128 (Ill. 2000).
105 See, Robert Kreisman, Jury Verdict for Plaintiff Over Institutional Negligence
Where Hospital Lacked Policy About Patient Notification of Revised Reports—Salinas v.
Advocate, CHI. MED. MALPRACTICE ATT’Y BLOG (November 29, 2011),
http://www.chicagomedicalmalpracticeattorney-blog.com/2011/11/.
106 Id.
107 Id.
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organizations (“HMOs”) have also been held liable under the
doctrine of institutional negligence, based on their procedures
for scheduling medical treatments and their practices for
assigning patients to a particular doctor.108
While the notion of institutional negligence has been
challenged in some contexts, such as in the context of tort
liability of religious institutions,109 the concept of institutional
negligence could be very useful in the educational context.
Using the concept of institutional negligence in the education
industry would put the “processes” at the center of attention,
instead of the most direct input (instructors’ conduct) or output
(students’ learning). Switching focus to internal rules, policies,
and quality assurance mechanisms inherently eliminates the
most-often mentioned obstacles in educational malpractice
cases, which include the inability to prove breach of duty due to
the lack of a uniform standard of care when it comes to
evaluating teaching methodology, and the “practical
impossibility [to] prove that the alleged malpractice of the
teacher proximately caused the learning deficiency of the
plaintiff student.”110 The following section will address issues
related to proving institutional negligence in the education
industry.
C.

Proving Institutional Negligence in the Educational
Context

Educational institutions, especially universities, usually
provide significant informational materials about themselves,
available either in print form or online. These materials can be

108 See Jones, 730 N.E.2d, at 1123–24 (Count I of the plaintiff’s second amended
complaint alleged that Chicago HMO was institutionally negligent for “assigning Dr.
Jordan as Shawndale’s primary care physician while he was serving an overloaded
patient population [and for] adopting procedures that required Jones to call first for an
appointment before visiting the doctor’s office or obtaining emergency care.”). See also
Shannon v. McNulty, 718 A.2d 828, 836 (Pa. Super. Ct. 1998) (“When a benefits
provider, be it an insurer or managed care organization, interjects itself into the
rendering of medical decisions affecting a subscriber’s care it must do so in a medically
reasonable manner.”). For more information on this issue, see Karen M. Coulson,
Institutional Negligence and the HMO: The Expanding Realm of HMO Liability in
Illinois: Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Illinois, 730 N.E.2d 1119 (Ill. 2000), 26 S. ILL.
U. L. J. 597 (2002).
109 Robert S. Marx, The Church Autonomy Doctrine: Where Tort Law Should Step
Aside, 80 U. CIN. L. REV. 431 (2012).
110 Donohue v. Copiague Union Free Sch. Dist., 47 N.Y.2d 440, 446, 391 N.E.2d
1352, 1355 (1979).
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course catalogs with course descriptions, faculty handbooks
that specify faculty obligations and expectations, and so on.
While it may be unreasonable to hold educational institutions
liable for general claims of “failure to learn,” educational
institutions should not escape liability if they fail to implement
and enforce policies and procedures that ought to assure
“fitness for purpose” quality. For example, faculty handbooks
can oblige faculty members to attend all classes, to begin and
end classes at the scheduled times, to meet for the full duration
of the academic term, to provide reasonable choices for classes
to be “made-up,” to distribute and follow the course syllabus, to
follow administrative procedures with respect to exams, to
make themselves available to students, and other similar
items.111
It is true that rules and policies like these primarily define
the contractual relationship between an educational institution
and an instructor, but nonetheless, they can be viewed as a
quality assurance mechanism. Consequently, if rules and
policies like the ones mentioned above exist, reasonable steps
should be taken to ensure that they are honored and enforced.
If such policies do not exist, this unlikely omission alone could
be a basis for institutional negligence. Ultimately, if an
instructor does not follow internal policies and, as a result, a
particular course ends up not matching relevant syllabi and/or
a course description, the fault should fall not only on the
instructor, but also on the institution due to the lack of
enforcement of internal policies that ought to preclude such a
scenario. The principle from the medical industry, where a
malpractice lawsuit against an individual most directly
responsible for wrongdoing can be completely different from a
negligence lawsuit against an institution that allowed certain
wrongdoings to happen,112 can and should be applied in the
111 See Professional Policies & Faculty Responsibilities—Basic Expectations of the
Faculty Position, UNIV. OF IOWA, http://clas.uiowa.edu/faculty/professional-policiesfaculty-responsibilities-basic-expectations-faculty-position (last visited May 21, 2013);
See
also
Faculty
Performance
Expectations,
SETON HALL UNIVERSITY,
www.shu.edu/academics/business/upload/ASCEXPT_RPT.pdf (last visited May 21,
2013);
See
also
Brownsville
Middle
School
Faculty
Handbook,
http://brownsville.dadeschools.net (last visited May 21, 2013); see also, Faculty
Employment Obligations and Expectations, NORTHEASTERN
ILL. UNIV.,
http://www.neiu.edu/DOCUMENTS/Faculty_Staff/Faculty_Resources/Policies/FEOE.pd
f (last visited May 21, 2013).
112 See Frigo v. Silver Cross Hosp. & Med. Ctr., 876 N.E.2d 697, 721, 723 (Ill.
App. Ct. 2007). See also Darling v. Charleston Community Memorial Hospital, 211
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education industry.
Cases like Miller v. Loyola University of New Orleans and
Bittle v. Oklahoma City University, for instance, are good
examples of cases that are about not only instructors’
malpractice, but also institutional negligence.113 In these cases
students alleged that, among other things, the instructors
changed the course time without the permission of law school
officials, covered approximately only 60% of the material that
ought to be covered,114 frequently arrived late for class,
discharged class early, canceled class altogether, and failed to
provide make-up classes.115 Interestingly enough, the faculty
handbook for Loyola University, for example, provides that
“each faculty member shall observe duly promulgated
regulations concerning such matters as the cancellation of
scheduled classes, examinations, . . . [and] current syllabi.”116
The relevant legal analysis in these types of scenarios should
focus on institutions’ mechanisms, or the lack of mechanisms,
for preventing the educational missteps mentioned above.
Failure to separate claims for instructional malpractice/
negligence from claims for institutional negligence, and the
tendency to label both claims as regular educational
malpractice claims (based on a “failure to learn”) is, legally and
logically speaking, unsound. Treating these two claims the
same is akin to mixing apples and oranges on the principle that
both are fruit.
Clearly, the discussion above is more applicable to postsecondary educational institutions, but the underlying
principle of institutional negligence can be applied to primary
and secondary education, albeit on different grounds. In fact,
two distinguished commentators have very recently introduced
some new ideas regarding educators’ liability in primary and
secondary education that are conceptually based on
N.E.2d 253 (Ill. 1965); Jones v. Chicago HMO Ltd. of Ill., 730 N.E.2d 1119, 1128 (Ill.
2000).
113 See Bittle v. Oklahoma City University, 2000 OK CIV APP 66, 6 P.3d 509,
511–515. See also Miller v. Loyola University of New Orleans, 829 So. 2d 1057, 1060–
61 (La. Ct. App. 2002).
114 Miller, 829 So. 2d at 1057.
115 Bittle, 6 P.3d at 511.
116 (“Each faculty member shall observe duly promulgated regulations concerning
such matters as the cancellation of scheduled classes, examinations, grades, current
syllabi, teaching assignments, contact hours, full-time employment, and assessment
and development of the curriculum.”). See http://academicaffairs.loyno.edu/facultyhandbook, p7–2.
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institutional negligence. In particular, Hutt and Tang argue
that educators today operate with access to unparalleled
amounts of data concerning teacher effectiveness and teacher
impacts on student learning.117 Consequently, instead of
seeking to hold educators liable for negligence claims based on
instructional negligence and failure to learn, a plaintiff should
seek to hold a school district liable for its negligence one step
earlier, that is, assignment to a classroom taught by a teacher
whom school officials know to be ineffective based on extensive
statistical data concerning the teacher’s performance.118 This
approach is clearly based on institutional negligence.
IV. POSSIBLE CRITICISMS OF INSTITUTIONAL NEGLIGENCE IN
THE EDUCATION INDUSTRY
A.

Academic Freedom and “Burger King” Issues

One could argue that administrators’ fear of liability for
institutional negligence has the ability to trigger far too much
overseeing, which could interfere with the academic freedom
rights of the faculty. Nothing could be more distant from the
truth and the law. Academic freedom in the United States has
long been deemed a “special concern of the First
Amendment.”119 As such, academic freedom rights essentially
provide that faculty members be entitled to freedom in
discussing their curriculum subject, freedom in research and
publication, and freedom to speak or write as citizens.120 To be
117 Ethan Hutt & Aaron Tang, The New Education Malpractice Litigation, 99 VA.
L. REV. 419, 425–27 (2013).
118 Id.
119 Keyishian v. Board of Regents, 385 U.S. 589, 603 (1967) (“Our Nation is
deeply committed to safeguarding academic freedom which is of transcendent value to
all of us and not merely to the teachers concerned. That freedom is therefore a special
concern of the First Amendment . . . ”). See also Regents of Univ. of California v. Bakke,
438 U.S. 265, 312 (1978) (“Academic freedom, though not a specifically enumerated
constitutional right, long has been viewed as a special concern of the First
Amendment.”).
120 See AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS & ASS’N OF AM. COLLS., 1940 STATEMENT
PRINCIPLES
ON
ACADEMIC
FREEDOM
AND
TENURE
3
(1940),
OF
http://www.aaup.org/report/1940-statement-principles-academic-freedom-and-tenure
(last visited May 23, 2013). Even though the 1940 Statement is merely a restatement of
principles and, as such, it serves as a guideline, and not binding law, the AAUP does
“enforce” the Statement in a way by listing colleges and universities that it finds to be
in violation of the 1940 Statement. See generally AM. ASS’N OF UNIV. PROFESSORS,
CENSURE LIST, AAUP, http://www.aaup.org/AAUP/about/censuredadmins/ (last visited
May 23, 2013).
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sure, it is worth noting that the exact legal basis and
implications of academic freedom rights are subject to much
debate,121 and courts have distinguished the importance of
academic freedom in tertiary, as opposed to in primary and
secondary education.122 Nonetheless, it is hard to imagine that
academic freedom could ever be invoked in situations where a
central issue is whether a faculty member is doing what he or
she is supposed to do based on rules and policies that define
employment-related expectations and obligations. If academic
freedom could be applied in such situations, then faculty
members could decide to teach only when it is not raining.
Interestingly enough, one professor has noted, “[s]orry kids,
you are not the authority in the classroom. Me Teacher. You
student. Me Teach, you learn. End of discussion . . . Education
is not a business. You are not my customer. My classroom is
not Burger King. You do not get to ‘have it your way.’”123
Although powerful and rather insightful, the problem with this
statement is the emphasis on “my classroom.” Since classrooms
where classes are held actually belong to the educational
institution, the faculty members should also realize that a
classroom is not Burger King and, just like students, they do
121 See David M. Rabban, Functional Analysis of “Individual” and “Institutional”
Academic Freedom Under the First Amendment, 53 SUM LAW & CONTEMP. PROBS. 227,
237 (1990) (“Fitting academic freedom within the rubric of the first amendment is in
many respects an extremely difficult challenge. The term ‘academic freedom,’ in
obvious contrast to ‘freedom of the press,’ is nowhere mentioned in the text of the first
amendment.”). See also Peter Byrne, Academic Freedom: A “Special Concern of the
First Amendment”, 99 YALE L.J. 251, 252–53 (1989). The author states,

The First Amendment protects academic freedom. This simple proposition stands
explicit or implicit in numerous judicial opinions, often proclaimed in fervid
rhetoric. Attempts to understand the scope and foundation of a constitutional
guarantee of academic freedom, however, generally result in paradox or confusion.
The cases, shorn of panegyrics, are inconclusive, the promise of rhetoric
reproached by the ambiguous realities of academic life. The problems are
fundamental: There has been no adequate analysis of what academic freedom the
Constitution protects or of why it protects it. Lacking definition or guiding
principle, the doctrine floats in law, picking up decisions as a hull does barnacles.
122
The majority opinion in Evans-Marshall v. Bd. of Educ. of Tipp City
Exempted Vill. Sch. Dist., 624 F.3d 332, 343–44 (6th Cir. 2010). The court stated,

As a cultural and a legal principle, academic freedom ‘was conceived and
implemented in the university’ out of concern for ‘teachers who are also
researchers or scholars-work not generally expected of elementary and secondary
school teachers.’ . . . ‘[U]niversities occupy a special niche in our constitutional
tradition’ and the constitutional rules applicable in higher education do not
necessarily apply in primary and secondary schools, where students generally do
not choose whether or where they will attend school.
123 Stanley Fish, Student Evaluations, Part Two, N.Y. TIMES BLOG (June 28,
2010, 9PM), http://opinionator.blogs.nytimes.com/2010/06/28/student-evaluations-parttwo/.
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not get to ‘have it your way.’” The faculty can “have it” only in
accordance with internal rules and policies of the institution
they work for. Academic freedom is not a route to avoid
employment expectations and obligations.
B. Burden on School Administrators
The standard for legal liability based on negligence is
“knew, or should have known.”124 One could feasibly argue that
the legal standard for negligence would put an undue burden
on administrators, as it is almost impossible for administrators
to keep up with each and every instructor within an institution
on a daily basis, especially in large institutions. These concerns
would perhaps be legitimate if institutional negligence lawsuits
in the educational context were based on traditional “failure to
learn,” as administrators would regularly have to monitor
students’ learning. However, unlike educational malpractice,
institutional negligence is primarily concerned with
implementing and enforcing internal rules and policies that
ought to ensure that an instructor is doing what he or she is
supposed to do. Consequently, any major disturbance for
administrators is unlikely, because it is highly probable that
administrators will know about instructors’ (mis)conduct prior
to a potential lawsuit. That is so because students and/or
parents are likely to report to administrators any serious
misconduct on the part of an instructor, such as frequent
absences, unreasonable tardiness, improper behavior, not
following the syllabus, and so on. Moreover, the administrators
have access to student evaluations that could point out
violations of relevant rules and policies. Therefore, it is more
likely than not that administrators will learn about instructors’
(mis)conduct without a daily run-around, and prior to a lawsuit
for institutional negligence.
In reality, the added pressure to implement and enforce
internal mechanisms for preventing errors would likely affect
student evaluations, which are one of the heartiest issues in
the education industry.125 For teachers, unfavorable
124 The “knew or should have known” standard has long been used in a great
number of negligence-based cases. See e.g. Svacek v. Shelley, 359 P.2d 127 (Alaska
1961); Mallory v. O’Neil, 69 So. 2d 313 (Fla. 1954); Stricklin v. Parsons Stockyard Co.,
192 Kan. 360, 388 P.2d 824 (1964); Bradley v. Stevens, 329 Mich. 556, 46 N.W.2d 382
(1951).
125 See Fish, supra note 123. See also Jonah E. Rockoff, Subjective and Objective
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evaluations “can destroy a career that took a decade to train
for.”126 On the other hand, the nature of some student
evaluations can cause administrators to refrain from even
criticizing teachers for unsatisfactory evaluations because that
could “potentially result in years (if not decades) of bitterness
between those involved.”127 Without question, poor student
evaluations can cause tensions between teachers and students,
teachers and administrators, and students and administrators.
Arguably, the best way to reduce the negative impact of
student evaluations is to make them more objective, and the
best way to make them more objective is to ensure that student
evaluations predominantly address the issue of whether a
teacher is doing what he or she is supposed to do. In all
fairness, students might not always be well positioned to judge
whether a teacher possesses mastery of his or her subject area,
whether a teacher is clear, well prepared, or generally caring.
However, students are exceptionally well positioned to answer
questions related to teachers’ absences, tardiness, following the
syllabus, making-up classes, holding office hours, and so on.
Consequently, the added pressure to enforce internal rules and
policies would likely prompt educational institutions to seek
direct input from those on the “ground.” Such a scenario would
inherently add more objectivity to student evaluations, which
would be a desirable trend, as many studies point to the overly
subjective nature of student evaluations.128
Evaluations of Teacher Effectiveness, AM. ECON. REV., May 2010, at 261–266.
126 Fish, supra note 123.
127 Nicholas Dagostino, Giving the School Bully a Timeout: Protecting Urban
Students from Teachers’ Unions, 201163 ALA. L. REV. 177, 195 (2011). The author
states,
Principals cannot fire ineffective teachers, and apparently they are afraid even to
criticize them, which would potentially result in years (if not decades) of bitterness
between those involved. Farcically, in schools that rate teachers as either
satisfactory or unsatisfactory, “about 99 percent of all teachers in the United
States are rated ‘satisfactory.’” Even when evaluations utilize a broader rating
scale than just satisfactory and unsatisfactory, one study showed that ninety-four
percent of teachers received one of the top-two ratings while less than one percent
of teachers were deemed to have performed unsatisfactorily. As a result,
exceptional teachers do not get recognized (or rewarded), average teachers are not
given feedback on what specifically they should improve, and poor teachers are
generally retained regardless of whether they make improvements.
128 See e.g. Samer Kherfi, Whose opinion is it anyway? Determinants of
Participation in Student Evaluation of Teaching, J. OF ECON. EDUC., Aug. 2011, at 19–
30; See also Ingrid Farreras & Robert Boyle, The Effect of Faculty Self-Promotion on
Student Evaluations of Teaching, COLL. STUD. J., June 2012, at 314–322; See also Scott
Freng & David Webber, Turning up the heat on online teaching evaluations: Does
“hotness” matter? TCHN. OF PSYCHOL., 2009, at 189–193; See also John Adams, Student
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V. CONCLUSION
William Bennett, the former United States Secretary of
Education, stated more than 25 years ago, “[t]here are greater,
more certain, and more immediate penalties in this country for
serving up a single rotten hamburger than for furnishing a
thousand schoolchildren with a rotten education.”129 Since then,
scholars have actively sought to articulate various legal
theories of educational malpractice, but the courts have
consistently been reluctant to recognize claims for educational
malpractice, on both legal and policy grounds. Consequently, a
“ticket” to a classroom still does not entitle a student to more
than a right to be there for a certain period of time, and it is
practically impossible to hold educators accountable for the
quality of their performance. Educators are indeed treated like
rock stars under the current approach to educational
malpractice.
This Article has argued in favor of adopting the concept of
institutional negligence in the educational context as a way of
enhancing the accountability and effectiveness of educational
institutions. Using the concept of institutional negligence in
the education industry would put institutions’ “processes” for
assuring the desired “fitness for purpose” quality at the center
of attention, instead of the most direct input (instructors’
conduct) or output (students’ learning). Switching focus to
quality assurance mechanisms inherently eliminates the mostoften mentioned obstacle in educational malpractice cases,
namely, the inability to prove breach of duty due to the lack of
a uniform standard of care when it comes to evaluating
teaching methodology. Consequently, the courts would finally
have a chance to adequately address damages in the context of
educational malpractice, which could ultimately clarify the
parameters of educators’ obligations towards students.

Evaluations: The Ratings Game, INQUIRY, Fall 1997, at 10–16.
129 John N. Maclean, Indiana Makes Book on Theory of Education Reform, CHI.
TRIB., Oct. 4, 1987, Section C at 1, 4.

